Our marriage is dead, when the pleasure is fled:
rates and the parties' relative wealth following divorce but also their behavior prior to and during marriage. We conclude that it is time to question whether unilateral no-fault divorce is worth its costs to the institution of marriage.
Marriage has been characterized alternatively as a sacrament, an institution, a status, and a partnership.' Although each of these terms is descriptive, and adds to our sense of what marriage is and can be, for purposes of economic analysis it is more useful to look at marriage as a contract. No one denies the fact that it is a contract that begins the marriage relationship, but when we speak of what exists after its inception, the contract analogy appears problematic. One objection to thinking of the ongoing marriage as a contract is that many of the terms of the marriage are prescribed by the state, not to be varied by the parties' private agreements. 4 Perhaps a more telling criticism is that much of what makes a good marriage has to do with the affective relationship between the spouses.' It seems improper to speak of something at once so intimate and so integral in the same terms used for a business transaction. 6 Despite these difficulties, academics writing about marriage 7 and jurists dealing with its consequences 8 frequently use the language of implicit, or long-term, relational contract. The relationship is designed to endure for a long time (hopefully for the lifetime of the parties) and to be so complex that any attempt to specify in detail all of its terms would be futile as well as perhaps destructive. It is, moreover, exactly the sort of enterprise in which it is efficient for the parties to make significant and specific investments: contributions of time and energy and money, to each other and to their children, that may not see fruition for many years and that may be worthless if the relationship does not endure. 9 In any other contract, even if the agreement allows either party to terminate the relationship at will, the parties can still expect their investments to be protected and their dealings to be governed by the laws of contract through the usual damage remedies in cases of breach.° Otherwise, no one would enter into such agreements or make such investments, for who would choose a deal with unenforceable terms?
While marriage has many of the characteristics of relational contracting, it has become in many places a kind of unenforceable, illusory contract:"' it is splendid as long as both spouses are committed to the relationship but ethereal once one spouse decides to take advantage of the other. The thesis of this article is that the terms of the marriage contract are, to a great extent, the expectations of the parties as to the allowable parameters of marital behavior. We argue that changes in the institutional structure reduce the cost to one or both of the parties of undertaking activities inconsistent with the marital agreement. This inconsistent behavior is what we define as "opportunistic behavior" in the marital context. The changes in the institutional structure that make marital promises unenforceable and allow opportunistic behavior are the enactment in many states of no-fault divorce with the simultaneous removal of fault (breach) as a consideration in grants of spousal support and property division. 2 A marriage is, as are many business relationships, now terminable at will, 3 but without penalties for breach of other conditions. 14 What would one predict in places where there is no way to enforce the marriage contract? Assuming that couples contemplating marriage pay any attention to these things, 5 one would hypothesize fewer marriages ex ante, fewer children (born later, after a longer trial period), more investment in individual careers rather than in the marriage, more divorces, and, ex post, more breaches by spouses in positions to behave opportunistically. 6 Some of these consequences may be temporary. At some future time, everyone might view marriage as little more than a long-term date, entered into to please parents or to signal that the relationship is exclusive. Since there would be fewer negative consequences for either party, such a marriage might be entered into more rather than less frequently. This "lite" version of marriage, however, would not support much investment by either spouse. The depressive effect on the analyzing the effects of enacting unilateral divorce legislation and the importance of the institution of alimony.
13 See, for example, Donald Butler & Marilyn Russell, Casting Stones: The Role of Fault in Virginia Divorce Proceedings, 20 U. Richmond L. Rev. 290, 295 (1986) . In a state where there is no-fault divorce, termination of the marriage is not in itself breach, so there is no legal reason for awarding either party the loss. See Brinig & Carbone, supra note 7, at 876 & n.89. See also Lynn Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 79, 99-100 (no-fault may bring more contests over collateral matters such as property distribution, spousal support, and child custody).
Our referee has pointed out that the breaching husband could lose not only support but also the services of the nonbreaching wife, while after divorce she need provide him no future services. There are two replies to his statement. First, because of the marriage market, the husband will probably be in a much better position following dissolution of the marriage than will his mate. Second, she is not released from all her marital obligations at the time of divorce: if she remarries or cohabits, she loses her right to alimony in many states.
14 Scott, supra note 12, at 53; Philip Selznick, The Idea of a Communitarian Morality, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 445, 452 (1987) ; Mary Ann Glendon, State, Law and Family: Family Law in Transition in the United States and Europe 25 (1981) .
15 The fact that they are increasingly entering into premarital contracts suggests that they might, but there is contrary evidence as well. See, for example, Scott, supra note 12; and Lynn Baker & Donald Emery, When Every Relationship Is above Average, 17 L. & Hum. Behav. 439 (1993) .
16 As defined by Timothy Muris, opportunistic behavior "occurs when a performing party behaves contrary to the other party's understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to the explicit terms of the agreement, leading to a transfer of wealth from the other party to the performer." Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 Minn. L. Rev. 521 (1981) . Even a threat is costly because resources are expended by both parties to perpetrate or protect against the behavior. birth rate should continue. Thus it may be the traditional type of marriage, meaning one with substantial investments, that is on a permanent decline. This article presents a theoretical discussion and an empirical test of the effects of the switch to no-fault divorce, which made the marriage contract illusory. We begin in Part II with an analysis of the elements of the marriage contract and a discussion of the historical enforcement of its terms. Part III discusses the idea of marriage as a relational contract in the context of such contracts in commercial law. Part IV presents an empirical analysis of three predictions of the illusory contract concept: fewer marriages, fewer children, and more opportunism in the form of spousal abuse. Part V concludes that it is time to rethink enforceability of the marriage contract.
II. THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT

A. Terms of the Marriage Contract
When couples marry, they may be unaware of exactly what responsibilities they are undertaking.
7 They may not think that the ceremony that marks their becoming husband and wife is anything but a rite of passage. Almost certainly they are not thinking of the rubric of "contract": of consideration and enforceability. Yet even the words of the marriage ceremony give substantive content to the idea of marriage. The marriage contract usually begins with the promise of each party to take the other as a wedded spouse, to have and to hold, for richer or poorer, in sickness and in health, for better or for worse, from this day forward, "as long as life shall last."' 18 These are words in present tense, unlike those of the engagement contract, and are therefore not simply hopes of what is to be. At the very least they mean that the parties intend their relationship to last permanently, 9 that they plan to live together, care for each other, 20 and support each other. 2 ' They anticipate changes and adversity and 17 Baker & Emery, supra note 15.
'8 These words are from the West Virginia Code, § 48-1-12b, prescribing the exact ritual for the celebration of marriage by judges. Virginia is unique in having a requirement.
'9 Compare Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3, 551 P.2d 323 (1973) . 20 See Department of Human Resources v. Williams, 130 Ga. App. 149, 202 S.E.2d 504 (1973) .
21 See Fincham v. Fincham, 160 Kan. 683, 165 P.2d 209 (1946) ; Hilbert v. Hilbert, 168 Md. 364, 177 A. 914 (1935) ; French v. McAnarney, 209 Mass. 544, 195 N.E. 714 (1935) ; Fricke v. Fricke, 257 Wis. 124, 42 N.W.2d 500 (1950) ; In re Higgason's Marriage, 10 Cal. 3d 476, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897, 516 P.2d 289 (1973)(medical care). pledge to work through them. 22 In some ceremonies, the couple also makes promises to "love and cherish" and to "forsake all others." Whether or not these words are used, the state will assume that the spouses will be civil to each other, respecting bodily integrity. 23 In most states, there is the further explicit pronouncement that the parties will be sexually faithful to each other. 24 The fact that the promises made during the marriage ceremony have explicit consequences can be demonstrated in several ways. First, an intention (which exists at the time of marriage) by one of the parties not to perform one of the "essentials of the marriage relationship" will allow the other to obtain an annulment of the marriage on grounds of fraud. 25 Physical or mental incapacity to perform will likewise be grounds for what is, in effect, rescission of the marriage contract. 26 Second, although many aspects of the marriage relationship can be modified by the parties' written agreement, certain terms, those included in every marriage contract, cannot be altered. 27 Third, in those states continuing to have fault grounds for divorce, breach of the marital promises by one party will allow the other to sue for divorce, 28 in addition to any other remedies available under civil or criminal law, 29 and may affect the award of alimony or the distribution of property. We turn now to a discussion of 22 Scott, supra note 12, at 12. Robert Scott, in Conflict and Cooperation in Long Term Contracts, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 2005 , 2007 , notes that initially parties to long-term contracts wish to distribute risks in the least burdensome way. Once conditions change they seek adjustments to realize greater benefits from the enterprise. historical models of marriage, emphasizing the way the terms of the marriage contract discussed above were enforced in each time period.
B. The "Old Marriage" and the "New Marriage"
For the first sixteen hundred years of the Christian era, marriages were viewed as indissoluble, 3 " as well as central to the preservation of land within particular families.
3 Although affection might grow out of long and close association between the spouses, it was by no means necessary for the practical purposes of marriage. This oldest and nearly universal model of marriage became obsolete in England and her colonies as first the Church, and then land, ceased being necessarily central to the relationship. 32 Marriage for romantic reasons became the ideal, and since human emotions need not remain eternally constant, and because marriage was no longer absolutely necessary for wealth, divorce became practically possible.
33
The consolidated remedy of divorce and alimony became an exclusive remedy during the nineteenth century, largely because of the development of the doctrine of interspousal immunity. Although a spouse could sue for breach of contract or for ejectment from solely owned property, there could be no action for torts to person or property. In part this was because of a reluctance to become involved with the intimacies of the marital relationship, in part because the doctrine showed a fear of disrupting marital stability that probably was not warranted, given the severity of some of the harm alleged. As one court said, "We will not inflict upon society the greater evil of raising the curtain upon domestic privacy to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence." 34 This, then was the "old marriage," an enforceable contract designed for the most part to be permanent, which encouraged values of altruism, Legal Hist. 197, 208 (1982) ; Shorter, supra note 32, at 5; Mary Ann Glendon, The New Family and the New Property, ch. 1 (1975) .
34 State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 459 (1868) .
sharing, and investment in the marriage. 3 5 The idea of fault, and of alimony as damages for breach of the terms of the marriage contract, 36 was central to the stability of this scheme, for the threat of an action for damages would encourage women to invest specifically in the marriage while encouraging their husbands to adhere to their portion of the marriage bargain. 37 This freed husbands to invest in market skills, easily transferable to a new relationship, and encouraged more efficient production of market and household goods because of wives' comparative advantage in "household production.- 38 The "old marriage," which might have existed at any time prior to the 1960s, was characterized always in terms of an entity or a union rather than as some sort of an arrangement for gain between two players. 39 There was a clear understanding of what conduct was acceptable and what the terms of the contract were. 40 And there were clear consequences for breaching those standards: for women, the loss of their status and support, 41 for men, the loss of wealth through property division or alimony . 41 The "old marriage," however, began to be threatened as an institution by the Progressive Era. The mortal blow came in the 1940s, when because of World War II large numbers of women entered the marketplace. 43 Soon a pattern emerged of numbers of unhappy spouses going to states where divorces were easier or less costly to obtain and procuring "quickie" ends to their marriages. Another means to evade a relatively strict divorce law was the practice of collusive or fraudulent divorce, where the complaining spouse would perjure himself or herself or actually manufacture incidents (most often, of adultery) with the collaboration of the other partner.'
"No-fault" divorce was first introduced in 1969 in California, which until then had retained adultery as its only ground for divorce. 45 California divorces could now be granted upon a finding of "irretrievable breakdown of the marriage," which not only eliminated the necessity for a showing of fault but also the need for both spouses agreeing to the divorce. 4 6 The California statute was heralded by its proponents as the opportunity for release from moribund marriages. Some feminists argued that with greater financial opportunities available to women outside marriage and no barriers to exit from wedlock, women ought to be truly free to reach their individual potential. In addition, the threat of fault divorce, with its disastrous economic consequences, would no longer be there to penalize them if they left a bad marriage. 47 Freedom, however, from the restrictions of fault divorces, that is, a nonfault liability rule, proved troublesome for the institution of alimony. Since fault (breach), which had previously been the trigger for alimony (damages), was no longer necessary (or available, in some cases) for divorce, alimony was to serve the function of providing for the needy spouse who could not support himself or herself because of lack of job training or education or the competing burdens of child care. Alimony was only to be a temporary measure, for once the dependent spouse was rehabilitated, or was no longer in need, alimony payments should not bind the other spouse financially. The marriage relationship ended in a "clean break." 48 The primary method of securing economic equality was to be through (nonhuman capital) property distribution, which could be made without regard to fault and with a recognition that each spouse contributed to the marriage as a partner, whether working in the home or the labor market.
49
The changes to equitable distribution of property and the provision of alimony in cases of real need, however, have not been complete solutions. Since many women do not earn as much as their husbands, their opportunity costs of remaining out of the market are lower, and frequently they remain primary caretakers for their children. 5 1 Despite gender neutrality of custody laws, if the couple breaks up, they still get child custody. In those marriages that do not last long enough to accumulate significant tangible property, 52 many women upon divorce have found themselves with lower wealth than before no-fault divorce. This unintended consequence of no-fault divorce has been noted by many writers. 53 ' Jacob, supra note 44, at 122. Texas never allowed alimony following an absolute divorce and views it "like car payments on a car that's been wrecked." Levinsohn, Breaking Up Is Still Hard to Do, Chicago Tribune Sunday Magazine, October 21, 1990, at 16. The "clean break" concept is criticized by Milton Regan in Market Discourse and Moral Neutrality in Divorce Law (paper presented at the Utah Law School, October 15, 1993).
1 Community property jurisdictions have always viewed marriage as creating a community of assets to be shared equally upon its dissolution, whether by death or divorce. Michael Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Interspousal Transactions, 19 Baylor L. Rev. 20 (1967) 167, 202 (1969) .
52 Many marriages end with the couple owning only their automobiles and perhaps a small equity in a home. If the house must be sold and the proceeds divided and the woman must find alternative housing for herself and the children, the small cash award of the property division will be quickly spent. There is yet another repercussion of no-fault divorce that has been largely ignored in the literature, and that is its effect upon the marriage contract itself. 4 The marriage obligations have been themselves rendered illusory because no penalties can be exacted for breach of any marital promises. There is therefore no incentive other than a moral obligation or a feeling of affection to prevent either party from engaging in postcontractual opportunism. 5 1 Some legislatures have tried to meet this objection to no-fault divorce as well, by compensating spouses who make sacrifices during marriages. Courts, struggling with this problem, have modified existing legal doctrines to recognize additional assets.
56 Privately, more and more couples have written antenuptial (and postnuptial) contracts that can be the basis for actions for breach. 7 But there has been little recognition of the cost of the problem, that is, a change in economic incentives.
Although the divorce rate itself has leveled off after its steady growth since the Second World War 8 and its upward shift from trend after the introduction of no-fault statutes, there has been no apparent decrease in opportunistic behavior. For one thing, more and more cases of spousal Rev. 1039 Rev. (1983 . Even Duncan and Hoffman, however, found that women's living standards declined 30 percent in the first year after divorce, while men's rose 10-15 percent. Although the question of whether women were much better off following divorce under the fault system remains controversial, the perception that they were is nearly universal. See Faludi, at 19. It is their perception (or fear of leaving) that may allow opportunism.
51 It may, however, lie underneath Part 4 of Marjorie Schultz's Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 207 (1982) ; and it is certainly discussed in Cohen, supra note 4; in Stake, supra note 35; and Scott, supra note 12.
55 Carl Schneider has reminded us that social norms inhibit breaching behavior even in the business context. The Contract in Family Life and Business Practice, (paper presented at the International Society for Family Law North American Conference, Moran, Wyoming, June 11, 1993) . 56 Obviously both alimony and property distribution are forms of division of future income streams. An advanced degree earned during marriage is thus property to be distributed at its dissolution, see O' Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743, 489 N.E.2d 712 (1985) . Unlike most property, however, a degree does not have a fixed value at the time of divorce but depends upon the contribution of the degree-holding spouse. See, for example, Graham v. Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978) . An award of its present value therefore constricts the future behavior of a spouse in a way that dividing an asset whose value is more completely determined upon market conditions does not.
57 Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 3, at 556-59, suggest that this will deter opportunism.
58 The rate leapt after no-fault divorce. Thomas Marvell, Divorce Rates and the Fault Requirement, 23 L. & Soc 'y Rev. 537, 546-63 (1978) . The trend may reversing, at least temporarily, although studies suggest that 60 percent of first-time marriages will eventually end in divorce. Carlee Scott, As Baby Boomers Age, Fewer Couples Untie the Knot, Wall St. J., November 7, 1990, at BI, col. 3. and child abuse are reported. Of course, this may be due either to increased reporting facilities or to the increasing consciousness of women who may believe, for the first time, that something may be done if they complain about abuse. We would expect, however, this increase in reporting to occur across all states. Our empirical work attempts, through regression analysis, to control for some of the variables which might indicate increased reporting, such as per capita income. A second change is that more and more decisions chronicle sacrifices made to advance the career of an ungrateful spouse. It is possible, of course, that we are dealing with "lagged" behavior. The investments in human capital characteristic of the reported "degree division" cases occurred prior to a realization by the disadvantaged spouses that such investments might not be recouped. We would predict that henceforth there would be fewer such marriage-specific investments. Thus women would be less likely to specialize in household production or invest in their husbands' careers, and more likely to continue working to advance their own careers during the marriage. Some writers suggest that this behavior itself may undermine the marriage.
59
These observations are consistent with the change from a paradigm that recognized that marriage, like any other relational contract, provides opportunities for rent-seeking opportunism. In the older system, the rule of fault was designed to limit such rent-seeking behavior through its delineation of implied or express covenants, violation of which led to breach of the marital contract with its concomitant damage remedy. Since the marriage contract can no longer be enforced, an unexpected consequence of the "divorce revolution" is that the bargain itself has become illusory.
6°A
s we have already noted, many commentators see marriage as akin to a contract terminable at will. 61 Outside the marriage context, however, the principles of breach, and remedy for breach, remain in dischargeable contracts while the agreements remain in effect. What currently happens in marriages in many states 62 is that they are never effective contracts, 59 See, for example, Stake, supra note 35, at 405-6. 60 In some respects, the institution of marriage has come full circle: both in the covenant marriage and in the new marriage any behavior is tolerable, albeit for different reasons.
61 See, for example, Scott, supra note 12, at 17; Haas, supra note 12, at 884; Stake, supra note 35, at 401, 406. 62 Some states permit fault to bar or limit the award of alimony, while others have eliminated it entirely. Although in all states no-fault divorce is available, no-fault alimony is the rule in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Montana, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin, a total of thirteen states. In eight states, marital misconduct amounting to grounds for fault divorce is an absolute bar to alimony, and in twenty-eight and the District of Columbia, it may be a factor. Texas has never offered postdivorce alimony. so that the parties to them are free to act opportunistically at minimal cost. 6 3
III. MARRIAGE AS A RELATIONAL CONTRACT
Marriage before the age of divorce was a relationship in which the wife had only a slight source of power because she could threaten to impose a minimal financial burden on the husband if he "abandoned" her. The husband, however, had a very great deal of power because he could threaten to "cast out" the wife, whereupon she would have only very limited sources of income/social standing and no opportunity to remarry.' One would expect to find, and did find, many "marriages of convenience" where marital fidelity was not important, particularly for husbands, 6 " and wives were thought of in some ways as little more than servants. 66 There were all sorts of problems with this characterization of marriage, including the fact that husbands would frequently desert their wives, leaving them remediless and without any property or other means of support. 67 The law gradually evolved, in consequence, to a new form of "equilibrium marriage," where there was a state-imposed set of contractual obligations, a remedy for breach (specific performance through alimony, or continuation of the duty of support), 6 and a clear understanding of what was and was not permissible behavior. For this period of somewhere in the neighborhood of two hundred years in this country, marriage was a contract, 69 but because of its complexity and indeterminate length, it was a relational or institutional contract, one in which the parties were incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined obligations.
"
North Dakota in 1985 became the last state to adopt no-fault divorce, 71 meaning that fault on the part of the other spouse need not be proved by the plaintiff in order to obtain a divorce. Some states, those we have called "no-fault" in this article, go a step further. 72 In these, fault cannot be considered either in obtaining the divorce or in securing alimony, so there can be no significant activities that trigger breach. There can be no breach and no remedies, and the contract has become illusory. The wife may have even less power than in the divorceless form of marriage because the only threat she can make is that it may take the husband some time to replace her "household services" after their divorce (either by purchase or remarriage). It is more difficult for the woman to remarry, and she usually earns far less than the husband in the job market, for a variety of reasons. 73 Upon leaving, therefore, she loses more than he does, which gives him more bargaining power. 74 The cost of deviant behavior has decreased, so one would predict both that there will be more divorces and that there will be more opportunistic behavior by spouses.
75
This opportunism should occur primarily in marriages entered into under the old rules. For couples marrying more recently, the effect would be different and more complex. Our empirical work looks at both types 69 Interestingly enough, however, it was during this period that Joel Bishop, in his Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce § 3 (6th ed. 1881), began the notion that marriage was a status. 7 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 27, at 1091; Meyers & Crafton, supra note 63. 7' Although the state laws vary from divorce upon a showing of "irreconcilable differences" to those allowing divorce after separation for a specified period of time ranging from six months to three years, basically all states now allow marriage to be terminable at will. See Scott, supra note 12, at 17-18.
72 We disagree with Peters's division between "unilateral" and "mutual" divorce states according to 1978 divorce laws. One problem is that she puts the states retaining fault grounds as well as "unilateral" grounds into the unilateral category because "in these states the unilateral rule dominates." Peters, supra note 46, at 446. The other problem is that in several of her "unilateral" states, fault can still be used in the determination of alimony. Because we used data from years up through 1987, it is also relevant that some states have changed to what we would call a pure no-fault system since 1978.
71 See Regan's thoughtful discussion of these issues, supra note 47. 74 It may be the threat of leaving that in fact triggers spouse abuse. Joan Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1991).
75 People now pay attention to the situation where one spouse obtains a divorce after the other has worked to allow his or her graduate education, whether the other has been bilked systematically of assets for a separately held business enterprise, or where there is spousal or child abuse. See notes 92-94 infra. of effects. Spouse abuse measures the first sort of effect: the effect of the change in regimes upon marriages entered into under the older system, or at least where there was not sufficient understanding of what the new system might mean in terms of compensation upon divorce. With marriages contemplated when no-fault divorce has been in place for some years, we would expect effects on the number of marriages contracted and the number of children.
IV. AN EMPIRICAL LOOK AT OPPORTUNISM IN MARRIAGE
The predictable consequences of marriage becoming an illusory contract therefore involve both ex ante and ex post conduct. In order to stave off opportunism, there would be less long-term marriage contracting.
6 Ex post, for those already married when unilateral no-fault divorce becomes possible, there should be less investment in the marriage (fewer children) 77 and more "taking advantage," or opportunism. There are data available on the first two of these, for academics including lawyers, sociologists, and economists have been interested for many years in the rates of marriage and fertility. What we test here is this behavior over time, contrasting birth and marriage rates in states with fault and no-fault regimes and looking at rates before and after the introduction of no-fault divorce.
The ability to impose opportunistic outcomes should be greater for the party with the lower costs of divorce. To the extent that the nonenforceability of marriage benefits one gender (the man) so that marriage becomes more attractive, 78 it acts to deter the other gender (the woman). That is, for the man it may be more attractive to marry rather than to stay in a nonmarital relationship with a particular woman. This is because, so long as the relationship is good, he gets all the benefits of the security 76 Cohen, supra note 4, at 296, notes Landes's article, supra note 12, which studied the effect of the elimination of alimony on the number of marriages and the rate of marital fertility, finding that both decreased where alimony was unavailable. Cohen writes that "it is not clear if the causality runs from the divorce laws to the marriage rate or if both are moved by some independent vector of other variables." Cohen at 296 & n.63.
77 Wardle, supra note 13, at 126, also sees lack of commitment as related to no-fault divorce (which he defines differently than we do in this article). Because they are easier to obtain, there should also be more divorces. Peters, supra note 46; Marvell, supra note 58.
78 This occurs in part because for men the investment during marriage is, at least traditionally, more general. Women are more likely to invest in marriage-specific capital and are less likely to invest in the human capital necessary for success in the labor force. and companionship and provision of services that marriage provides. If things sour, he may leave with little penalty other than the fees for filing for divorce and to pay his attorney. 79 For the woman, in contrast, the costs of divorce have increased through the introduction of no-fault divorce, particularly if she desires to have children. 80 Although the prospect of marriage, as opposed to one or more nonmarital relationships, may be appealing, being married is probably less important than formerly because of the reliability of contraceptives, her increased earnings in the labor market (higher opportunity cost), and the growing social acceptability of cohabitation. Since there is no compensating payment by men, and there must be agreement between husband and wife for the contract to be formed, there should be fewer marriages as women become aware of its costs. In fact, there is some evidence that this is occurring. 8 See Figure 1 .
Since there is no real measure of the cost of divorce, or any data on the number of antenuptial contracts (since they are not registered with any official agency), the equation we tested was far simpler. We looked at the number of marriages per thousand population for the years 1965-87 as a function of population per state, the presence of true no-fault divorce, and a trend (or time) variable. 82 The pooled time series regression appears as These lower transaction costs are dominated for women by the higher economic and social costs of being a divorced person, frequently one with custody. Women with small children do not remarry as often, or as speedily, as other divorced women, and their subsequent marriages are also more likely to end in divorce. Gary Becker, Elisabeth Landes, & Robert Michael, An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability, 85 J. Pol. Econ. 1141 Econ. , 1152 Econ. , 1157 Econ. (1977 . Single mothers of young children must also obtain child care for the times when they are dating. Of course, the party more eager to marry (the man) could bribe the other's acquiescence through promises of a more favorable "deal" upon divorce. More couples would then enter into antenuptial agreements. We have no way of measuring the extent to which this occurs. See Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 3, 82 It would take some time for the impact of no-fault divorce to be felt throughout the population. 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 FIGURE 1 is that, during the years examined, the number of marriages per thousand population has generally increased. This general increase, however, has not taken place in the more populous states. (One might surmise that this is primarily where there is more cohabitation outside marriage.) Nor has the general increase taken place in the no-fault states: marriage is negatively and significantly related to the presence of a true no-fault regime. We therefore cannot reject our hypothesis that the presence of no-fault decreased the willingness of women to commit themselves to marriage.
83
The matter of the effect of no-fault divorce on children is more problematic since a number of factors besides changes in no-fault regimes have undoubtedly contributed to the declining birth rate in the United States and other industrialized nations,' and there is a correlation be-83 Obviously there is a host of other variables affecting the marriage rate. Some are captured in the trend variable. Some account for the large portion of the variance that was not explained by this analysis.
8' These include, in addition to a changed divorce, the change in the number of married women working, the fact that more women defer children until they complete higher education, the attractiveness for some couples of small families, and the availability of reliable contraception and legal abortion. There is a large literature on the economics of fertility. See, for example, Peters, supra note 46, at 452; Gary Becker & Nigel Tomes, Child Endowments and the Quantity and Quality of Children, 84 J. Pol. Econ. S143 (1976). tween these factors: women are earning more in the marketplace and therefore have a greater opportunity cost in staying home to raise children (or even in taking time off to bear them)." The real prospect of divorce for spouses in every state has indicated, even to those already married, that it is risky to bring children into a relationship, both because divorce is very difficult for children and because, for women, the presence of children reduces their chances of remarriage and their income earning potential. 8 6 This must be qualified since children could act as hostages to hold together an otherwise unenforceable contract. But this assumes that the consequences to both parties of divorce would be equally catastrophic. In fact, for whatever reason, women seem to value children more highly than do their husbands. 7 As discussed above, women usually end up with custody and, because of children, are less able to obtain high paying full-time employment or remarry. It might be assumed that, as with marriage, there would be countervailing incentives for men that 85 Fathers share these costs as well since they must, theoretically at least, bear an increased share of child care if their wives are working. But see Shelley Coverman & Joseph Sheley, Change in Men's Housework and Child-Care Time, 1965 -1975 , 48 J. Marriage & Fam. 413, 420 (1986 ; Michael Geerken & Walter Gove, At Home and at Work: The Family's Division of Labor (1983) , suggesting that not much change in the allocation of these responsibilities has occurred. The "domestic burden" borne by wives has been estimated to account for 70 percent of the difference in earnings between married men and women. Ellman, supra note 4, at 4 & n.2.
86 Haas, supra note 12, at 887-88. See also Fuchs, supra note 50. For men the negative is primarily paying child support. They may shirk this obligation because they cannot control how the money is spent by the custodial former wives. Yoram Weiss & Robert Willis, Children as Collective Goods in Divorce Settlements, 3 J. Lab. Econ. 268 (1985) . 87 See Fuchs, supra note 50, at 67-68. Our referee has pointed out that, to the extent that children are important to their fathers, it might be in the interest of any particular mother to threaten to make visitation difficult in the event of divorce. If all women made such a credible threat, conscientious fathers might try harder to keep their marriages together, with a resultant cultural norm of lifetime marriages. Following divorce, however, it is not in the mother's interest to carry out the threat, especially if she is conscientious. Since marriages which result in children are not usually a repeat game, whether or not she carries out the threat herself will probably not affect her individual case, and the cultural norm will not be generated. This is a variant of the Prisoner's Dilemma or Rules-Discretion game. would encourage having children. But women are particularly well situated to prevent pregnancy through contraception and are uniquely able to terminate it by abortion. They therefore have much greater control over the decision. 88 Unquestionably, there has been a decreasing fertility rate, but so far there has been no showing that the birth rate is lower in those states with no-fault divorce than elsewhere. We ran a simple pooled time-series regression for the period 1965-87, testing the birth rate per thousand population against marriage, population, the availability of nofault divorce, and time. 89 The results are included in Table 2 . What Table  2 shows is that the birth rate has significantly decreased over time. The relationship between the birth rate and the marriage rate is not statistically significant (although positive). Most important for our analysis is the fact that, as we would predict, there are fewer births per thousand population in those states that have adopted a true no-fault regime. This article is one of the first to focus on opportunism that occurs after marriage has taken place. 90 We argue that no-fault divorce raises the opportunity costs of divorce for those who are the victims of spouse abuse because of the strong wealth effects in no-fault states. 91 For the 88 Although in functioning marriages husbands and wives are likely to agree on whether or not the wife should abort, the U.S. Supreme Court maintains that a state cannot require a married woman to notify her husband of her decision. Planned Parenthood of Southern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 2751 , 112 S. Ct. 2791 . Even if the husband used no contraception, the wife could still prevent the pregnancy.
89 A reader has expressed the concern that the model is underspecified: that is, that we should have included such independent variables as income, female labor force participation, urbanization, race, and ethnic composition. This would be important to the extent that these are correlated with the no-fault variable, but we have not found a correlation. For a general discussion of choice of variables in linear regression, see John Neter & William Wasserman, Applied Linear Statistical Models 371 (1974) . 90 Cohen's opportunism involves the unilateral termination of marriage by the husband before the wife can reap the "quasi rents" she expected in the later years of marriage when her value in the marriage market falls relative to his. Cohen, supra note 4, at 288-89.
91 Of course, it is possible that other things are going on here. Women need not face the proof problems of the fault system or the prospect of desertion, both of which were barriers to exit. If these were important, there should be more rather than less abuse in states retaining fault. The other possibility is that we are only measuring the level of reporting, which undoubtedly varies from state to state. Reporting would be affected by the effective-abusing husband, the opportunity costs of divorce are reduced on the margin because there are no real damages granted for his breach. In divorce he loses only the person he was married to, not any of his other wealth. The types of resulting opportunistic behavior that could be predicted in such an illusory marriage contract involve the situations where one spouse leaves shortly after the other has worked to allow his or her graduate education, 92 where one has swindled the other systematically of assets for a separately held business enterprise, 93 where there is adultery, 94 or where there is spousal or child abuse. Although the first three situations can be analyzed theoretically, 95 there is no way to obtain accurate data on the number of cases in which such self-seeking behavior has occurred. The degree or investment cases are anecdotal. Litigation will only occur when a change in the interpretation of the law is involved, so that the reported cases are not a fair sample of all times in which this has occurred and divorce has followed. Obviously the cases do not count the many times in which such an investment is made and there is no divorce. Even the claimed incidence of adultery cannot be gauged from the pleadings in the no-fault states since, by definition, fault cannot be considered. It is possible, however, to obtain data on spousal abuse.
Violence between spouses has undoubtedly been a problem for centuries, but it was not usually the subject of legal intervention because, as one court said in 1868, "We will not inflict upon society the greater evil of raising the curtain upon domestic privacy to punish the lesser evil of trifling violence." 9 6 National attention, however, has focused on domestic violence since the mid-1970s.
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Since there is no central government or other authority that collects or indexes information about spousal abuse by state, data were obtained for ness of state protective orders, the frequency of police response, and the availability of social service networks. Our empirical analysis attempts to capture many of these favors. What the statistics show is that it is highly unlikely that our results were reached by chance. Table 3 contains an alphabetical list of reported crisis calls and shelter visits by state.
99 Table 4 contains a ranking of states by number of crisis calls reported per thousand population.
Our theory would predict that the incidence of "negative" opportunism within marriage (behavior outside what would otherwise be the norm), proxied by spouse abuse, should increase in states allowing divorce and alimony without consideration of fault (EARLY and LATE)."° Of course, abuse does not occur solely because of relaxed penalties in terms of divorce settlements. Abuse in the family (ABUSECAP) might also be expected to vary with such social characteristics as income per capita (INCOMEPC), urbanization (METROPOP), and the amount of violent crime in general (CRIME). Abuse might be more readily reported by some segments of the population than others (RELIG),'°' so that these groups would show greater numbers of crisis calls. Box-Cox regressional analysis was performed using the above factors as the independent (righthand side) variables, with the number of crisis calls to abuse centers as the dependent variable.
The resulting estimated equation predicted about 35 percent of the variance in calls to abuse shelters. See Table 5 . As predicted, spouse abuse occurred with greater frequency in states that had abolished consideration of fault in divorce and its incidents. It also varied positively and significantly with the reporting variables and with income' 2 and varied negatively and significantly with urbanization and insignificantly with political liberalism (DEM). 1°3 The general incidence of violent crime was not significantly related to the number of spouse-abuse complaints, but 98 Of course, victims of violence who are not married may also use these services. In states that separate the types of complaints, however, the incidence of nonspouse abuse was negligible.
99 A date indicates the year a no-fault system was enacted. A zero indicates that fault is still available either in the grounds for divorce or in allocation of alimony or property distribution. In two states (Hawaii and Vermont), data for crisis calls were unavailable. The number used was extrapolated from the number of shelter days. It should be noted that, although these numbers are approximations, if the two states are eliminated, our empirical results are still stronger.
100 Not only the presence of no-fault divorce but also the date the scheme was enacted makes a difference. We therefore ordered the data based upon whether no-fault legislation was enacted prior to 1975 (EARLY), between 1975 and the present (LATE), or not at all. was positively signed. Abuse indeed seems to be related to the absence of penalties embodied in the divorce statutes.1°4
V.
IN SEARCH OF THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT
Our model predicts that no-fault has caused a change in the distribution so that behavior within marriage has become more variable. It has also caused a reduction in the investment in marriage and children that would occur otherwise. The presence of fault divorce caused the marriage contract's ex ante and ex post values to be relatively similar. There used to be incentives to marry, to have children, and not to surprise the marriage partner.°5 Now, with no-fault, the risk or uncertainty associated with marriage has increased.
The puzzle becomes how to provide incentives so that once again the majority of behavior clusters around what most people conceive of as "marriage." Without a wholesale reallocation of property rights, the mechanism that would seem most efficient is to provide once again for breach if significant events occur."° This could be done without resurrect-104 Tobit analysis endogenizing the timing and presence of no-fault divorce as a function of Catholicism (negatively related), women in the labor force (positively related), the divorce-to-marriage ratio (positively and already significantly related), and political liberalism (positively related) identifies only the extremes of early enactment of no-fault legislation and the lack of no-fault.
5 Compare Becker, Landes, & Michael, supra note 80, suggesting that divorce occurs at least in part because during the marriage the spouses gain more (undesirable) information about each other.
t"O This view is supported at least in part by Haas, supra note 12, at 894-95; Cohen, supra note 4, at 302-3; and Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 197, 253. ing fault as grounds for divorce but would require the use of fault in the awarding of alimony.'°7 In the language of contract theory, contractual partners could dissolve their contracts voluntarily, but if the dissolution were a result of breach of the agreement, then a damage remedy would be available to the nonbreaching party. If it is clearly understood what the marriage contract entails, significant breach of the terms of the agreement could then, once again, result in an award of "damages" through the alimony system.
A similar result, in terms of compensation, could theoretically be reached either by allowing an action for damages in tort for such outrageous behavior as spouse abuse' 1 8 or in restitution for investments made in the other's career. But any action outside the divorce system would be expensive (because of the increase in transaction costs), might require abrogation of interspousal immunity,' 0 9 and apparently is not giving spouses the incentive to abide by the marital contract. Robert Scott speaks of various mechanisms for insuring optimum investments in commercial long-term contracts. He concludes that transferring risk to the party best able to control the production process, or to the party subjectively placing a lower cost on the risk, or distributing the risk between the parties will all decrease the likelihood of opportunism.' 10 His ideas are echoed in the marital context by the then chairman of the American Bar Association Family Law Section, who wrote: "Substantial fault preserves the concept of individual accountability, which is missing from pure no-fault theories. One way to discourage adultery, physical cruelty or other genuine misconduct is to place the burden of dissolution squarely on the shoulders of the responsible party. Pureno-fault removes this disincentive and, indeed, promotes easy access to divorce without regard to accountability." ' ' All of the problems we have discussed-fewer marriages, less specific investment in children, and more opportunistic behavior-can, at least in part, be linked to the inability to enforce marital promises characteristic of what we have called no-fault divorce. As a society, we need to rethink the question of whether this particular reform is worth it.
